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ESSAY
HEDONIC ADAPTATION AND THE SETTLEMENT OF
CIVIL LAWSUITS
John Bronsteen*
Christopher Buccafusco**
Jonathan S. Masur***
This Essay examines the burgeoning psychological literature on happiness and hedonic adaptation (a person’s capacity to preserve or recapture her
level of happiness by adjusting to changed circumstances), bringing this literature to bear on the probability of pretrial settlement in civil litigation. The
existing economic and behavioral models of settlement are incomplete because
they do not incorporate the effect of adaptation on the sum for which a plaintiff is willing to accept an offer. When an individual first suffers a serious
injury, she will likely predict that the injury will greatly diminish her future
happiness. However, during the time that it takes her case to reach trial, the
aggrieved plaintiff is likely to adapt hedonically to her injury—even if that
injury is permanent—and within two years will report levels of happiness far
closer to her pre-injury state than she had expected. Consequently, the
amount of money that the plaintiff believes will fairly compensate her for her
injury—will “make her whole” in the typical parlance of tort damages—will
decrease. The sum that the plaintiff is willing to accept in settlement will
decline accordingly, and the chances of settlement will increase.

INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the most important recent development in social science research is the emergence of an interdisciplinary group of psychologists,
economists, and public policy analysts devoted to the study of happiness,
or, as it is known in the literature, “hedonics.”1 Investigators have begun
to ask questions about the kinds of things that make people happy, about
people’s ability to predict what will make them happy, and about the intensity and duration of changes in happiness.2 The answers to these
questions have challenged some of the fundamental tenets of psychologi* Assistant Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
** Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law.
*** Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. The authors wish to thank
Susan Bandes, Adam Cox, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin, Eric Posner, and Richard
Posner for helpful comments.
1. See Daniel Kahneman et al., Preface to Well-Being: The Foundations of Hedonic
Psychology, at ix, ix (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter Well-Being]
(defining and exploring hedonic psychology).
2. See id. (describing past and future hedonic research).
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cal and economic theory.3 They also have significant practical implications for medicine, public policy, business, and the law. The legal implications of the new happiness research are only now being realized, and
this Essay is the first to apply these findings to the settlement of civil
litigation.
Among the most important and robust findings of hedonic psychology is the discovery that many positive and negative life experiences—
including significant events such as winning the lottery, being denied tenure, and becoming disabled—have little long-term effect on well-being.4
Immediately after experiencing these and other events, people initially
show substantial changes in reported happiness, but in the weeks,
months, and years that follow, they undergo a process of “hedonic adaptation” that returns them to a pre-event level of well-being. This adaptation occurs, in part, because people tend to shift their attention away
from the novel consequences of the event and back toward the mundane
features of daily life.5 While individuals are able to adapt to many
changes within a couple of years, other changes, it seems, tend to resist
such adaptation—particularly injuries that cause constant or worsening
pain.6
Although people often experience hedonic adaptation to major life
events, researchers have found that people fail to recognize and remember adaptation’s effects.7 This memory failure then leads to an inability
to predict the hedonic impact of future experiences. An overwhelming
body of evidence now shows that when people are asked to predict how
future changes are likely to affect their well-being, they make significant
errors in their estimations of both the intensity of the change and its
duration.8 Thus, healthy people tend to predict that becoming disabled
will have a more substantial impact on their well-being and that the impact will last longer than it actually does. In effect, they neglect to account for the strength and speed of hedonic adaptation.
3. See Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, Introduction to The Psychology of
Economic Decisions: Rationality and Well-Being, at xiii, xiii–xv (Isabelle Brocas & Juan D.
Carrillo eds., 2003) [hereinafter Rationality and Well-Being] (describing challenges posed
by behavioral economics to both psychologists and economists).
4. Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman writes: “The fundamental surprise of well-being
research is the robust finding that life circumstances make only a small contribution to the
variance of happiness . . . .” Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective
Happiness: A Moment-Based Approach, in Rationality and Well-Being, supra note 3, at
187, 199.
5. On the role of attention in adaptation, see infra notes 80–84 and accompanying
text.
6. On the differences between adaptable and unadaptable injuries, see infra notes
72–77 and accompanying text.
7. See Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 617, 634–35 (1998) [hereinafter
Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect] (discussing reasons why people may not be attuned to
their ability to emotionally adapt to undesired outcomes).
8. For a discussion of this research, see infra notes Part II.B.
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In this Essay, we apply this research on hedonic adaptation to the
settlement of civil lawsuits. Specifically, we examine the likely effects of
adaptation on a plaintiff seeking the recovery of pain and suffering or
punitive damages in a personal injury suit. Following the research on
hedonic psychology, we suggest that such a plaintiff, when making her
initial settlement demands shortly after her injury, will tend to overestimate both the severity and the duration of her injury. Her attention will
be drawn toward the novel and painful features of the injury, and she will
fail to recognize the extent to which hedonic adaptation will enable her
to cope with her new circumstances. During the many months that she
will have to wait before trial, she will begin to experience the effects of
hedonic adaptation, lifting her perception of her own well-being, and, we
suggest, making her more willing to settle for a lower sum.
The legal literature is replete with attempts to weigh the benefits of
additional trial processes—error reduction, fairness to litigants, improved
opportunities to participate—against the administrative costs of delay.9
Indeed, modern due process doctrine is largely organized along these
lines.10 Yet while all of these analyses count trial delays as pure economic
losses, we propose that, by allowing plaintiffs time to adapt to their injuries, such delays may result in an increase in settlements that avoid some
of the costs of trial. Accordingly, we suggest that current accountings of
drawn out litigation processes have overstated the net costs attributable to
extended procedure.
Part I of this Essay sets out the principal law and economics model of
civil settlement as well as recent challenges to the model drawn from psychological research. In Part II, we elaborate on the social scientific research on hedonic adaptation and affective forecasting. In Part III, we
apply the findings of hedonic psychology to the settlement of personal
injury lawsuits, and in Part IV, we offer a series of empirically testable
predictions about such lawsuits and reflect on potential implications and
objections.

9. For a particularly incisive treatment of the relationship between due process
requirements and government decisionmaking costs, see Adam M. Samaha, Undue
Process, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 601 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976). In that case, the
Court wrote:
[D]ue process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government’s interest . . . .
Id. at 335.
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I. THE FACTORS THAT DRIVE CASES TOWARD SETTLEMENT
Fewer than two percent of federal civil lawsuits go to trial,11 but any
case that does so presents a puzzle for law and economics. The value of a
lawsuit can be monetized by multiplying the probability of winning by the
amount to be won, and then that value can be paid in settlement, avoiding the large transaction costs of litigation. Both parties stand to gain
handsomely from such a deal, so why would they ever choose to forgo it
in favor of a trial?
Early hypotheses, operating under the assumption that parties rationally pursue the goal of maximizing wealth or utility, pointed to bargaining strategies or informational asymmetries as the reasons litigants
opt for trial.12 Behavioral law and economics then modified the assumption of rationality by considering factors that undermine rational
choice.13 Ultimately, behavioral psychology has indicated that wealth
maximization is not the only goal driving decisions about settlement.14
Because other goals—principally, a desire for an outcome perceived as
fair—influence a plaintiff’s decision whether to settle, that decision is affected in turn by a plaintiff’s changing perception over time of the sum
that constitutes fair compensation.
This Part briefly sketches the time that elapses during the litigation
process. It then surveys the development of the literature on settlement,
describing the analytical framework we aim to augment via insights from
the new psychological literature on happiness.
A. The Rational Actor Model of Settlement Decisionmaking
Since Charles Dickens wrote about Jarndyce and Jarndyce more than
150 years ago,15 many others have bemoaned that litigating a civil case all
the way through trial takes a long time.16 Today, the median interval in
federal court between filing and trial adjudication is about two years.17
That period of time encompasses the filing of preliminary motions,18 the
taking of discovery,19 the filing and adjudication of summary judgment
11. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 459, 462 tbl.1 (2004)
(depicting trial rates declining since 1962 to less than two percent in 2002).
12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part I.B.1.
14. See infra Part I.B.2.
15. Charles Dickens, Bleak House (Norman Page ed., Penguin Books 1971) (1853).
16. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982)
(criticizing “delay” and “time lapse” associated with litigation).
17. James C. Duff, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, 2006 Judicial Business of the
United States Courts 192 tbl.C-5 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus20
06/completejudicialbusiness.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (depicting
“Median Time Intervals From Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases” for U.S. district courts).
18. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 7, 12.
19. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 30, 33, 34; see also Stephen D. Easton, My Last Lecture:
Unsolicited Advice for Future and Current Lawyers, 56 S.C. L. Rev. 229, 240–41 (2004)
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motions,20 and finally the jury trial itself.21 Yet even that figure does not
include the time that elapses after an injury has occurred and before filing, while the harmed party decides whether to pursue a legal remedy.
When that decision is made and a lawyer is found, the lawyer must investigate whether the issue merits litigation.
Few cases continue through all the phases of litigation. A lawsuit can
settle at any time from filing through adjudication, or it can be terminated by a grant of a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment.22 The point is simply that when a case does not settle early, the
steps it must take to wend its way through the litigation process to judgment take considerable time.
Along the way, lawyers will typically continue to engage in settlement
negotiations with little or no involvement by the clients, who are not professional negotiators and whose involvement might therefore run contrary to their own interests.23 Even if these negotiations have not borne
fruit by the time the pretrial litigation is nearing completion, a party still
has much to gain by settling before trial. The expense of trial itself can
be considerable or even, in some cases, vast. Not only must the lawyer be
paid for every hour spent preparing for and performing in court,24 but
also expert witnesses may have to be paid,25 and the court itself must
(“Many civil litigators spend most or all of their time drafting discovery requests, compiling
and reviewing documents and data to respond to discovery requests, drafting discovery
responses, filing motions for protective orders regarding discovery or motions to compel
discovery, responding to these motions, and otherwise fighting over discovery issues.”).
20. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Summary judgment is an important part of litigation. See
Edward Brunet & Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment: Federal Law and Practice §1:1,
at 1–2 (3d ed. 2006) (“As the primary procedure used to avoid unnecessary civil trials,
summary judgment is probably the single most important pretrial device used today.”);
John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 522, 523–24 (2007)
[hereinafter Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment] (noting summary judgment is a
“staple of how today’s U.S. civil justice system conducts business”). As a result, it can
consume considerable time on the part of both lawyers and the court. See Jeffrey W.
Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 95, 171 (1988)
(“The judge deciding a summary judgment question must along with her law clerks read,
research, reflect, hold a hearing, read and research some more, and often must draft,
revise, and issue a lengthy written opinion as well.”); Morton Denlow, Summary Judgment:
Boon or Burden?, Judges’ J., Summer 1998, at 26, 26 (“[Summary judgment motions] are
expensive to prepare and consume substantial lawyer and judicial resources.”).
21. See U.S. Const. amend. VII.
22. See Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 530 (listing points
at which a lawsuit can be terminated).
23. See Windle Turley, Creating the Right Settlement Environment, Trial, June 1994,
at 28, 29 (recognizing clients may lack training and information necessary for successful
negotiation).
24. D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 875, 903 (2006) (noting bulk of cost to plaintiff is lawyer fees for time spent
in preparation for and at trial).
25. Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, supra note 20, at 534–35.
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expend its limited resources on only this case.26 Much is to be saved,
therefore, by avoiding trial even if the parties have failed to avoid the
costs of pretrial litigation.
A settlement is possible, of course, only if the largest amount of
money that a defendant is willing to pay exceeds the smallest amount of
money that a plaintiff is willing to accept.27 In the early 1970s, William
Landes and Richard Posner began to analyze settlement through the lens
of law and economics.28 Landes and Posner developed the core insight
that the cost of litigating a case opens up a zone of bargaining within
which the result for each party will be better than that party’s expected
utility from litigating to trial. Specifically, a litigant will calculate the
value (or cost, for a defendant) of a lawsuit by multiplying the damages
by the probability of winning, then subtracting the cost of litigation.29 If
the litigants each come to a similar assessment of the value of the case,
then they will settle because doing so saves them the transaction costs of
litigation.
It is the introduction of transaction costs that makes all the difference. For example, suppose that a plaintiff sues for $100,000 in damages
and has a fifty percent chance of winning at trial. Assume that litigating
the case to adjudication would cost the plaintiff and defendant each
$10,000. That would make the expected value of the litigation $40,000
for the plaintiff and the expected cost $60,000 for the defendant. Any
settlement between $40,000 and $60,000 would be better for both parties
than a trial. The bargaining zone would thus be $40,000 to $60,000, and
one would expect a settlement somewhere within that zone.30
26. See id. at 540–41 (recognizing that until trial ends, the court cannot fully attend
to other cases); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 421 (1982) (“If
cases are disposed of quickly, the time saved can be used to consider more cases.”). One
commentator has estimated that trials cost federal courts about $4,000 per day, excluding
the cost to litigants. David Wippman, The Costs of International Justice, 100 Am. J. Int’l L.
861, 868 (2006). Although he was discussing criminal cases, many of the costs (such as
judicial salary) apply equally to civil cases.
27. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement:
An Experimental Approach, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 107, 111 (1994) [hereinafter Korobkin &
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers] (“Lawsuits will settle if the defendant’s maximum offer is
higher than the lowest offer the plaintiff will accept.”).
28. William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & Econ. 61
(1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973); see also John P. Gould, The Economics of
Legal Conflicts, 2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973) (seeking to show why a larger percentage of
lawsuits are settled out of court and providing hypothesis about what causes cases to go to
trial). Building on their work, George Priest and Benjamin Klein later proposed a model
of settlement—predicting that when cases fail to settle, they will be adjudicated in favor of
the plaintiff fifty percent of the time—that has come to be identified with the assumption
of wealth maximizing behavior. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4–5 (1984).
29. Posner, supra note 28, at 418.
30. For a similar explanation and example, see Russell Korobkin, Aspirations and
Settlement, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 7 (2002) [hereinafter Korobkin, Aspirations].
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Importantly, the wider the bargaining zone, the higher the
probability of settlement.31 Parties are more likely to reach agreement if
they have a greater degree of bargaining space—space in which both
sides will benefit—with which to work. In addition, this model implies
that settlement becomes more likely as the plaintiff’s claim shrinks relative to the transaction costs of litigation.32 As this occurs, this available
bargaining zone comes to occupy a greater proportion of the valuation
space within which the two parties will be negotiating.
B. Behavioral Modifications of the Rational Actor Model
The classic economic model is based on the assumption that litigants
act rationally to try to maximize their wealth. Still working within the
framework of wealth maximization as the litigants’ only goal, several
scholars have added nuances or modifications to these models by emphasizing the limits of human rationality. And more recently, evidence has
emerged that litigants pursue goals other than wealth maximization—in
particular, that they are far more likely to accept a settlement offer if they
perceive it as fair.
1. Obstacles to Wealth Maximization. — Even when people aim to maximize wealth, they may fail due to psychological factors that lead them to
act irrationally. One set of behavioral considerations known as prospect
theory can shift the bargaining zone toward plaintiffs or defendants.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have famously demonstrated that
when people face the prospect of a gain, they are risk averse; but when
they face the prospect of a loss, they are risk seeking.33 A settlement is a
fixed gain for a plaintiff or loss for a defendant, whereas a trial holds out
the prospect of a larger but uncertain gain or loss.34 Applying prospect
31. See Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 73, 101 (1990) (“[I]t is natural—as well as customary in the legal
and economic literature—to assume that the likelihood of settlement is positively related
to the width of the settlement zone.”); Rave, supra note 24, at 892 (“Generally, the wider
the settlement zone, the more likely the case is to settle.”). The existence and size of the
bargaining (or “settlement”) zone is, on this account, the primary condition on which
settlement depends. See Korobkin, Aspirations, supra note 30, at 6 (noting disputes will
settle in bargaining zone or not at all if zone does not exist).
32. See Posner, supra note 28, at 419 (“[A]ny increase in the stakes must increase the
likelihood of litigation by making the plaintiff’s minimum settlement offer grow faster than
the defendant’s maximum settlement offer.”).
33. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 Am.
Psychologist 341, 344 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An
Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263, 268–69 (1979); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 Science
453, 453 (1981).
34. One might speculate that, at least under certain circumstances, plaintiffs would
not view the money at stake as a gain and defendants would not view it as a loss. If, for
example, a defendant had taken money from the plaintiff via the underlying tort or
contract violation, then anything less than a full repayment of that baseline sum could be
treated by the defendant as an overall gain and by the plaintiff as an overall loss. This
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theory to the topic of settlement, Jeffrey Rachlinski has used experiments
to illustrate that plaintiffs can generally be expected to be irrationally risk
averse whereas defendants can generally be expected to be irrationally
risk seeking.35 This phenomenon does not reduce settlement rates, but
does shift the bargaining zone downward by making plaintiffs willing to
settle for less and defendants unwilling to settle for amounts that riskneutral litigants would find acceptable.
These effects reverse when probabilities are low.36 Imagine a nuisance lawsuit wherein the plaintiff has a very low chance of victory (say,
one percent) but a very high amount of damages were she to win (say, ten
million dollars). The bargaining zone would shift upward because people are risk seeking with respect to gains and risk averse with respect to
losses when probabilities are low (explaining, for example, why they buy
lottery tickets).37 The lowest payment acceptable to the plaintiff would
be a higher number than it would have been if she were risk neutral,
whereas the defendant would be willing to pay a correspondingly higher
sum.
2. Fairness and Goals Other Than Wealth Maximization. — The above
analyses of settlement retain at least one basic assumption of the classic
economic model: A litigant’s goal is to maximize her wealth.38 She
might fail due to imperfect information, hard bargaining, or cognitive
biases, but her objective is not in question. Important literature in behavioral psychology has suggested, however, the need to change that assumption. There is evidence that litigants are not interested purely in wealth
maximization, but also consider other values like fairness when deciding
whether to accept a settlement offer.39 This evidence corroborates the
possibility is mentioned briefly infra Part I.B.2. However, Rachlinski’s experimental
findings suggest otherwise, indicating that generally plaintiffs view settlements as gains
whereas defendants view them as losses. See infra note 35.
35. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 113, 118–19 (1996). In one experiment, undergraduates were assigned the role of
attorney for either a plaintiff or defendant in a property lawsuit. They were told the
amount the plaintiff stood to gain at trial and the percentage chance of such a plaintiff
victory. Then they were told that the opposing side had offered to settle for an amount
that corresponded to the probability times the amount; e.g., if a trial victory would yield
$100,000 and the plaintiff had a seventy percent chance to win, then the offer was $70,000.
Far more plaintiff-attorney subjects than defendant-attorney subjects accepted the offer
rather than take the all or nothing risk of a trial. Id. at 135–40.
36. Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 163, 168 (2000).
37. See id. at 167 (“When choosing between low-probability gains and losses with
equal expected values, Kahneman and Tversky have found that individuals make riskseeking choices when selecting between gains and risk-averse choices when selecting
between losses.”).
38. More precisely, her goal is to maximize utility, which is defined as wealth with a
built-in accommodation for rational risk aversion in keeping with the declining marginal
value of money.
39. Fairness is not the only nonmonetary consideration that can matter to litigants.
See Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
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emphasis that scholars have long placed on fairness or justice in civil
procedure.40
The stage was set for such evidence by the results of a game known as
“ultimatum bargaining.”41 In a classic version of such a game, two people
are given a sum of money (say $20) and told that one of them (the
Proposer) will choose how to divide it between them. If the other (the
Accepter) accepts the proposed division, then that division will be final,
but if he rejects it, then neither of the two participants will receive anything. A rational Proposer would allot $19 (or $19.99, if the division were
not limited to whole numbers) to himself and $1 to the Accepter, and a
rational Accepter would accept the division in order to receive $1 rather
than nothing. But people routinely turn down such divisions, contrary to
economic self-interest.42 In fact, offers under twenty percent of the total
are regularly rejected.43 Such behavior suggests that people care about
other values—in particular, their perceptions of fairness.
Russell Korobkin and Chris Guthrie have conducted experiments regarding settlement that appear to support this view.44 In one such experiment, subjects were asked to decide whether to accept a settlement offer
in a hypothetical personal injury case. All subjects were told that they had
been hurt in a car accident through no fault of their own and that they
were suing an insurance company. If they won at trial, they would receive
$28,000, whereas if they lost, they would receive $10,000 (the amount
undisputed by the insurer). Their lawyer told them that the result of a
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 77, 79–80 (1997) (“Litigants litigate not just
for money, but to attain vindication; to establish precedent; ‘to express their feelings’; to
obtain a hearing; and to satisfy a sense of entitlement regarding use of the courts . . . .”
(quoting Austin Sarat, Alternatives in Dispute Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims
Court, 10 Law & Soc’y Rev. 339, 346 (1976)) (footnotes omitted)).
40. See, e.g., George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. Legal Stud. 135, 139 (1992) [hereinafter Loewenstein et al., SelfServing] (“[S]ubject disputants seemed more concerned with achieving what they
considered to be a fair settlement of the case than maximizing their own expected value.”);
see also John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1419,
1448–49 (2003) (distinguishing between actual justice and adequate settlements in class
action context); Owen M. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 10–11
(arguing that justice is different from efficiency and should be prioritized over it in civil
justice system); Resnik, supra note 26, at 444–45 (1982) (expressing concern that docket
pressures may be causing judges wrongly to value efficiency over justice).
41. See Werner Güth & Reinhard Tietz, Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey
and Comparison of Experimental Results, 11 J. Econ. Psychol. 417, 447 (1990) (describing
research using ultimatum bargaining games and results); Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving,
supra note 40, at 142–43 (observing that fairness concerns affect bargaining in ultimatum
bargaining games).
42. See Martin A. Nowak et al., Fairness Versus Reason in the Ultimatum Game, 289
Science 1773, 1773 (2000) (“The irrational human emphasis on fair division suggests that
players have preferences which do not depend solely on their own payoff . . . .”).
43. Karen M. Page & Martin A. Nowak, Empathy Leads to Fairness, 64 Bull.
Mathematical Biology 1101, 1102 (2002) (“One half of offers of 20% or less are rejected.”).
44. Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 27, at 110–11.
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trial could go either way, and the defendant offered to settle for
$21,000.45
There were two groups of subjects. Those in Group A were told that
they had owned a car worth $14,000 that was destroyed in the accident,
and those in Group B were told the same thing except that their car had
been worth $28,000. Members of Group B were far less likely to accept
the settlement offer than were members of Group A.46
This experiment is particularly revealing. The odds of winning at
trial, the damages sought, and the settlement offer were held constant for
both groups. According to the assumptions of the rational actor model,
both groups should have viewed the offer similarly.
But the groups do diverge. One way to characterize the divergence
is as a simple offshoot of the core idea of prospect theory: Group B,
unlike Group A, views the $21,000 settlement offer as a loss rather than a
gain because it falls short of the injury Group B has suffered.47 Accordingly, Group B would be more likely to gamble on recovering the “full”
amount of $28,000 at trial. Another characterization would be that the
subject plaintiffs cared about values other than maximizing wealth—in
particular, that they cared about achieving a result they viewed as fair
compensation for their loss. Either way, we are left with the conclusion
that plaintiffs compare settlement offers to the amount they have been harmed and
are far more likely to accept offers exceeding that amount.
Such a conclusion has important implications in light of hedonic adaptation to injury or adversity, as we will see. Due to such adaptation, a
plaintiff’s assessment of how severely she has been harmed will often
change over time. This change, in turn, can be expected to affect the
range of offers that she will be willing to accept in order to settle.
C. Putting It All Together
Among the many points that appear in the literature surveyed in this
Part, one simple idea stands out in importance. All commentators agree
that the less money a plaintiff is willing to accept in order to settle, the
more likely settlement will be. Contrary to some early assumptions,48
45. Id. at 130–32.
46. Id. at 132–33.
47. See id. at 109 (“People avoid risk when they choose between options they
understand as gains, but they prefer risk when they select between choices viewed as
losses. . . . [S]ettlement rates will depend on whether the offeree understands a given
settlement offer as a gain or loss.”).
48. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 28, at 61 (“The basic assumption of the model is that
both the prosecutor and the defendant maximize their utility, appropriately defined,
subject to a constraint on their resources.”); Posner, supra note 28, at 417–18 (“The
plaintiff’s minimum offer is the expected value of the litigation to him plus his settlement
costs, the expected value of the litigation being the present value of the judgment if he
wins, multiplied by the probability . . . of his winning, minus the present value of his
litigation expenses.”); Priest & Klein, supra note 28, at 4 (“According to our model, the
determinants of settlement and litigation are solely economic . . . . The most important
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there is now evidence that plaintiffs’ lowest acceptable sum is determined
in part by reference to the amount they feel would fairly compensate
them for the harm they have suffered.49
If a plaintiff’s perception of what would constitute fair compensation
were to decrease as time passed, then that passage of time would accordingly increase the likelihood of settlement. To be sure, many factors
could influence a plaintiff’s demand, and her current experience of the
injury is only one of them. But holding constant all such other factors,
one would expect a plaintiff to be more willing to settle if, over time, she
came to view a smaller amount as representing a fair payment for her
injury.
II. ADAPTATION TO DISABILITY AND THE FAILURE
AFFECTIVE FORECASTING

OF

When estimating the level of fair compensation for their injuries,
plaintiffs must make predictions about the impact those injuries will have
on their future lives. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a dearth of legal
scholarship addressing how plaintiffs make such predictions and how accurate their predictions are. Recent social science research on well-being
and prediction now provides clues to understanding plaintiffs’ settlement
behavior.
Consider this situation. On a scale of one to ten, how would you rate
your current happiness? Now suppose that on the way home from work
you are struck by a drunk driver and paralyzed from the waist down.
What do you predict would happen to your happiness immediately following the accident? How about a year or two years later? If you are like
most people, you would expect that after the accident your happiness
would plummet and that it would remain low for a long time. You would
probably predict that you would never be as happy as you were during
that pleasant afternoon spent in your office reading an article on the hedonic psychology of legal settlement. According to a considerable body
of recent psychological research, however, you would likely be wrong. Although your subjectively reported happiness level would decline immediately following the accident, social scientists studying people affected by a
host of disabilities—quadriplegia, kidney failure, lost limbs—have found
that the disabled return to pre-disability states of happiness surprisingly
quickly, often within two years.50 Moreover, psychologists have shown
that your failure to anticipate the extent and rapidity of your recovery is
not unusual. People consistently overestimate how unhappy a negative
assumption of the model is that potential litigants form rational estimates of the likely
decision . . . .”).
49. Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 27, at 144–47.
50. For an excellent summary of the initial research on hedonic adaptation, see
Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, in Well-Being, supra note 1,
at 302, 311–18 [hereinafter Frederick & Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation].
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event would make them, in part because they do not appreciate how
quickly they would adapt to their new lives.51
This Part explores recent social scientific research on adaptation to
disability52 and the inability to predict future states of happiness, known
in the literature as “failure of affective forecasting.”53 We describe the
evidence of hedonic adaptation as well as its limits, and we consider why
people are unable to anticipate how disabilities will influence their wellbeing.
A. Hedonic Adaptation
In 1999, Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz “announce[d] the existence of a new field of psychology”—hedonic psychology—that would study “what makes experiences and life pleasant and unpleasant.”54 Although some psychologists had been doing research on
hedonics for decades, the new hedonic psychology promised to bring together an interdisciplinary group of social scientists to “analyze the full
range of evaluative experience, from sensory pleasure to creative ecstasy,
from fleeting anxiety to long-term depression, from misery to joy.”55 Using analytic tools that range from traditional self-evaluation surveys to
beeper-activated mood assessments and longitudinal surveys of national
populations, hedonic psychology is quantifying individual and collective
happiness, and it is measuring the impact that positive and negative life
events have on subjective assessments of well-being. Very often, the results are surprising. Increased income, for example, does not make people much happier, but spending more time with family and friends
does.56 Most interestingly for this Essay, psychologists have found that
51. See Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7, at 634 (concluding from
research results that respondents recover much more quickly from variety of negative
events than they predicted).
52. Unless otherwise noted, when we refer to “disability,” we are not using the term to
refer to any specific legally or medically defined injury but rather as a catch-all category
covering a wide range of injuries, illnesses, and debilities that potentially affect one’s
health and happiness.
53. Daniel Kahneman & Robert Sugden, Experienced Utility as a Standard of Policy
Evaluation, 32 Envtl. & Resource Econ. 161, 169 (2005) [hereinafter Kahneman & Sugden,
Experienced Utility].
54. Daniel Kahneman et al., Preface to Well-Being, supra note 1, at ix, ix.
55. Id.
56. The economist Richard Easterlin compares how quickly people adapt to increases
in income due to concomitant changes in aspirations and how slowly they adapt to
nonpecuniary benefits like family life. He writes:
In particular, people make decisions assuming that more income, comfort, and
positional goods will make them happier, failing to recognize that hedonic
adaptation and social comparison will come into play, raise their aspirations to
about the same extent as their actual gains, and leave them feeling no happier
than before. As a result, most individuals spend a disproportionate amount of
their lives working to make money, and sacrifice family life and health, domains
in which aspirations remain fairly constant as actual circumstances change, and
where the attainment of one’s goals has a more lasting impact on happiness.
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most life events, including apparently devastating ones such as those that
cause permanent disability, actually have little prolonged effect on wellbeing. People, it turns out, adapt amazingly quickly to change.
The effects of this “hedonic adaptation,” understood as any action,
process, or mechanism that reduces the affective (emotional) consequences of an otherwise stable circumstance, were first detected in a canonical study on lottery winners and individuals with paraplegia or
quadriplegia.57 Asked to rate their general happiness and current experience of mundane pleasures, lottery winners were not significantly happier than controls, and accident victims were not as unhappy as had been
expected and above the midpoint of the scale, indicating that they considered themselves happy.58 These data suggested that people experience life as if on a “hedonic treadmill” such that good and bad events
cause brief changes in well-being with rapid returns to an established set
point.59 Although specific aspects of the treadmill theory have been challenged,60 a wealth of recent research has confirmed its general finding
for other disabilities. For example, studies have found that children and
adolescents with limb deficiencies exhibit remarkably good psychosocial
adjustment.61 People with spinal cord injuries report levels of well-being
similar to those of healthy controls,62 as do burn victims,63 patients with
colostomies,64 and those undergoing dialysis for treatment of kidney disHence, a reallocation of time in favor of family life and health would, on average,
increase individual happiness.
Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, 100 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. 11,176, 11,182
(2003); see also Richard Layard, Happiness: Lessons from a New Science 29–31 (2005)
(“When people become richer compared with other people, they become happier. But
when whole societies have become richer, they have not become happier—at least in the
West.”).
57. Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is Happiness
Relative?, 36 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 917 (1978).
58. Id. at 920–21.
59. See id. at 918 (describing processes of “Contrast and Habituation” that tend to
mitigate effects of extreme good or bad fortune). For a further explanation of the hedonic
treadmill theory, see Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in Well-Being, supra note 1,
at 3, 13–15.
60. See Ed Diener et al., Beyond the Hedonic Treadmill: Revising the Adaptation
Theory of Well-Being, 61 Am. Psychologist 305, 306–11 (2006) (suggesting modifications
to treadmill model); Richard E. Lucas, Adaptation and the Set-Point Model of Subjective
Well-Being: Does Happiness Change After Major Life Events?, 16 Current Directions
Psychol. Sci. 75, 76–78 (2007) (arguing that hedonic adaptation is not inevitable and may
depend on individual differences).
61. See Vida L. Tyc, Psychosocial Adaptation of Children and Adolescents with Limb
Deficiencies: A Review, 12 Clinical Psychol. Rev. 275, 276–77 (1992) (collecting studies).
62. C. Lundqvist et al., Spinal Cord Injuries: Clinical, Functional, and Emotional
Status, 16 Spine 78, 80 (1991).
63. David R. Patterson et al., Psychological Effects of Severe Burn Injuries, 113
Psychol. Bull. 362, 370 (1993).
64. See Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 Med.
Decision Making 58, 63 (1990) (finding patients with colostomies consistently assign
higher utility value to life with colostomy than do healthy patients).
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orders.65 As the authors of this last study note, “Although [hemodialysis
patients] report their health as being much worse than that of healthy
controls, they do not appear to be much, if at all, less happy than people
who do not have kidney disease or any other serious health condition.”66
The aforementioned studies all applied a cross-sectional methodology that compares the reported well-being of disabled people with that of
people who were not disabled. In a compelling new study by economists
Andrew Oswald and Nattavudh Powdthavee, the authors track changes in
subjective well-being longitudinally by comparing happiness ratings of individuals before their disability with assessments reported yearly following
the disability.67 Since 1996, the British Household Panel Survey has reported information on respondents’ psychological well-being and
whether and to what extent they suffer from a disability.68 In these
surveys, respondents rated their own level of happiness on a scale of one
to seven, with larger numbers indicating greater life satisfaction. Oswald
and Powdthavee analyzed the responses from people who originally reported no disability but who subsequently became disabled during the
course of the survey. They divided these people into those who were
moderately disabled (“disabled but able to do day-to-day activities including housework, climbing stairs, dressing oneself, and walking for at least
10 min[utes]”) and those who were seriously disabled (“unable to do at
least one of the above day-to-day activities”).69
Oswald and Powdthavee’s study produced noteworthy results. As a
group, people who became disabled reported an average well-being score
of 4.8 for the two years preceding disability, an abrupt fall to 3.7 at the
onset of disability, and then a subsequent rebound to 4.1 in the next two
years despite the fact that the disabilities themselves had not changed.70
Separating the moderately and severely disabled groups, the authors find
approximately fifty percent adaptation to moderate disability and thirty
percent adaptation to severe disability.71 Thus, there is substantial evidence that hedonic adaptation to disability is significant (if incomplete).
65. Jason Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A Study
Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. Experimental Psychol. 3, 6 (2005).
66. Id. at 7.
67. Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A
Longitudinal Study of Disability with Implications for Economists and Judges, 92 J. Pub.
Econ. 1061 (2008).
68. The survey contains over ten thousand adults who were interviewed between
September and December each year since 1991. Id. at 1065.
69. Id. There were 675 person-year observations in the “Moderately Disabled”
category and 3442 observations in the “Severely Disabled” category. Id.
70. Id. at 1066.
71. Id. at 1070. That is to say, over the course of two years, moderately disabled
people recover approximately fifty percent of their “lost” happiness, and even severely
disabled people regain more than thirty percent of the happiness they lost due to their
injury. Id.
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Due to its considerable size and longitudinal nature, Oswald and
Powdthavee’s recent study provides some of the strongest evidence for
adaptation to disability.72 That they did not find higher levels of adaptation may be due to their inability to distinguish between disabilities that
people can readily adapt to and those that are, in effect, “unadaptable.”
A number of studies have found that people have difficulty adapting to
particular categories of negative events. Low-level, chronic stimuli like
noise, dull pain, and headaches have substantial long-term effects on happiness, as do diseases associated with progressive deterioration.73 One
study, for example, found that instead of adapting to noise problems,
some college students actually became sensitized to it, experiencing
higher levels of annoyance as time went on.74 Others have shown that
people are less likely to adapt to unemployment75 and negative changes
in marital status such as widowhood.76 Most significantly for our purposes, chronic or progressive disorders such as rheumatoid arthritis and
multiple sclerosis appear to be resistant to adaptation in part due to the
deteriorating nature of the stimuli associated with such diseases.77 It is
also worth pointing out that even where hedonic adaptation occurs, it is
neither inevitable nor invariable. Although adaptation effects may be

72. But see Richard E. Lucas, Long-Term Disability Is Associated with Lasting
Changes in Subjective Well-Being: Evidence from Two Nationally Representative
Longitudinal Studies, 92 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 717, 722 (2007) [hereinafter Lucas,
Long-Term Disability] (finding no evidence of adaptation from same data set). Oswald
and Powdthavee note methodological differences between their paper and Lucas’s, but,
they write, “[W]e cannot be certain why we find much more adaptation than does Lucas.”
Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 67, at 1065 n.10.
73. Frederick & Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, supra note 50, at 311–12.
74. Neil. D. Weinstein, Individual Differences in Reaction to Noise: A Longitudinal
Study in a College Dormitory, 63 J. Applied Psychol. 458, 460 (1978).
75. Richard E. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life Satisfaction,
15 Psychol. Sci. 8, 11 (2004).
76. Richard. E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model of
Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 527,
535 (2003).
77. See Richard F. Antonak & Hanoch Livneh, Psychosocial Adaptation to Disability
and Its Investigation Among Persons with Multiple Sclerosis, 40 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1099,
1105 (1995) (“Regressions to earlier phases of the hypothesized adaptation process are
predictable from the renewed life crises associated with unexpected exacerbations of
physical symptoms and the resultant imposition of disability.”); Craig A. Smith & Kenneth
A. Wallston, Adaptation in Patients with Chronic Rheumatoid Arthritis: Application of a
General Model, 11 Health Psychol. 151, 151 (1992) (“[Rheumatoid arthritis] and its
associated pain have been linked to poor adjustment, including depressive symptoms and
impaired quality of life.” (citations omitted)). Frederick and Loewenstein note, however,
that the degree of adaptation may be particularly difficult to measure with these
progressive diseases. Frederick & Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, supra note 50, at 312
(“Even maintaining a constant hedonic state in the face of these deteriorating conditions
would be impressive evidence of hedonic adaptation.”).
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seen in the aggregate, individuals experience a range of responses to
adaptable disabilities.78
Understanding which disabilities are adaptable and which are not
should lead to a better understanding of the mechanisms of adaptation.
These mechanisms may range from physiological changes (such as increased upper body strength in paraplegics enabling more effective
wheelchair mobility) to conscious and unconscious cognitive changes in
disabled people’s “interests, values, [and] goals.”79
Most recently, psychologists and economists have focused on the role
attention plays in moderating the effects of negative events. Drawing an
analogy between the psychological response to negative events and the
body’s response to disease, Daniel Gilbert and his colleagues have suggested that people possess a “psychological immune system” that dampens the hedonic effect of disability.80 Defense mechanisms such as “rationalization, dissonance reduction, . . . [and] positive illusions” diminish
the intensity of the emotional response to disability by directing attention
away from the disability and toward new skills and new sources of pleasure.81 Similarly, Kahneman and Thaler note that attention is normally
directed toward novelty, including changes in response to disability.82
Therefore, “as the new state loses its novelty it ceases to be the exclusive
focus of attention, and other aspects of life again evoke their varying hedonic responses.”83 These coping strategies are evolutionarily adaptive,
allowing people to recover quickly from considerable misfortune.84
B. The Failure of Affective Forecasting—Focalism and Immune Neglect
Although people are capable of hedonically adapting to a variety of
positive and negative life events, recent social scientific research suggests
that they consistently fail to anticipate such adaptation. Over the past
decade, psychologists and economists have begun to study “affective fore78. See Diener et al., supra note 60, at 310–11 (“[W]e have found individual
differences in the rate and extent of adaptation that occurs even to the same event. In our
longitudinal studies, the size and even the direction of the change in life satisfaction varied
considerably across individuals.”).
79. Frederick & Loewenstein, Hedonic Adaptation, supra note 50, at 302–03.
80. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7, at 619.
81. Id.
82. Daniel Kahneman & Richard H. Thaler, Utility Maximization and Experienced
Utility, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 2006, at 221, 230 [hereinafter Kahneman & Thaler, Utility
Maximization].
83. Id.
84. See Lucas, Long-Term Disability, supra note 72, at 718 (“[J]ust as homeostatic
temperature regulation mechanisms prevent extreme heat or extreme cold from causing
physical damage to the body, homeostatic emotion regulation mechanisms may protect the
body from dangerous physiological and psychological reactions that occur with prolonged
emotional states.”); cf. Eugene Kontorovich, Comment, The Mitigation of Emotional
Distress Damages, 68 U. Chi. L. Rev. 491, 491 (2001) (suggesting emotional distress may be
mitigated by tort plaintiffs and lack of mitigation standards may lead to moral hazard
problems).
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casting”—people’s ability to judge how future experiences will make
them feel.85 Most people, it turns out, do a surprisingly poor job of predicting the intensity and the duration of future feelings.86 This inability
is particularly important in situations concerning disability and adaptation where it likely affects decisions about treatment.
When asked to predict how they will feel upon the occurrence of
some future hedonic event—eating a bowl of ice cream every day for a
week, having their favorite candidate win an election, being denied tenure, or suffering an injury—people are able to estimate whether that
event will make them feel good or bad (“valence”) and which emotions
they will feel. They are not very good, however, at predicting how
strongly they will feel (“intensity”) or how long the feeling will last (“duration”).87 For both positive and negative events, people predict that they
will feel more strongly than they actually do, and they predict that the
feeling will last longer than it actually does. Accordingly, a growing number of studies have shown that, in the case of physical disabilities, healthy
people regularly predict that disabled people will experience greater unhappiness for a longer period of time than they actually do.88
The most compelling explanation for the mispredictions associated
with affective forecasting suggests that people suffer from a “focusing illu85. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing
What to Want, 14 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 131, 131 (2005) [hereinafter Wilson &
Gilbert, Affective Forecasting] (“Research on affective forecasting has shown that people
routinely mispredict how much pleasure or displeasure future events will bring and, as a
result, sometimes work to bring about events that do not maximize their happiness.”).
86. For an excellent recent review of research on misprediction of hedonic reactions,
see Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317
Science 1351 (2007) [hereinafter Gilbert & Wilson, Prospection].
87. Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 85, at 131.
88. See Boyd et al., supra note 64, at 63 (finding that healthy controls assigned lower
utilities to colostomies than did patients who had undergone the procedure); David L.
Sackett & George W. Torrance, The Utility of Different Health States as Perceived by the
General Public, 31 J. Chronic Diseases 697, 702 (1978) (finding that patients undergoing
dialysis gave higher utilities to that treatment than did healthy controls); Peter A. Ubel et
al., Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions Be Improved by Drawing Attention
to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11 J. Experimental Psychol.: Applied 111,
111 (2005) [hereinafter Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine] (“One of the most commonly
replicated ‘happiness gaps’ is that observed between the self-rated quality of life of people
with health conditions and healthy people’s estimates of what their quality of life would be
if they had those conditions . . . .” (citation omitted)); Peter A. Ubel et al., Do Nonpatients
Underestimate the Quality of Life Associated with Chronic Health Conditions Because of a
Focusing Illusion?, 21 Med. Decision Making 190, 197 (2001) [hereinafter Ubel et al., Do
Nonpatients Underestimate] (finding that healthy peoples’ underestimates of quality of
life for paraplegics could not be altered by defocusing tasks); Peter A. Ubel et al.,
Misimagining the Unimaginable: The Disability Paradox and Health Care Decision
Making, 24 Health Psychol. S57, S57 (Supp. 2005) [hereinafter Ubel et al., Misimagining
the Unimaginable] (“Across a wide range of health conditions, patients typically report
greater happiness and [quality of life] than do healthy people under similar
circumstances . . . .”).
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sion”89 (also called “focalism”90) that causes them to pay too much attention to the narrow aspects of life that will be affected by a change while
ignoring the much broader ways in which life will remain the same.91 As
Wilson and his colleagues note, “People think about the focal event in a
vacuum without reminding themselves that their lives will not occur in a
vacuum but will be filled with many other events.”92 For example, when
people are asked to think about the effect paraplegia would have on their
lives, they tend to focus on the limitations it would create rather than, say,
their unaltered ability to enjoy a glass of wine or a conversation with
friends.93 By directing their attention to the changes wrought by disability, healthy people underestimate how happy they will remain. Focalism
thus accounts for a substantial amount of their mispredictions about affective intensity.
Faulty predictions about the duration of feelings associated with negative events are often caused by a failure to anticipate how rapidly the psychological immune system enables people to adapt to unpleasant emotions. Some researchers have referred to this failure to predict
adaptation as “immune neglect.”94 When asked to predict how long they
89. For an example of a focusing illusion, see David A. Schkade & Daniel Kahneman,
Does Living in California Make People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life
Satisfaction, 9 Psychol. Sci. 340, 344–45 (1998) (describing indications of focusing illusion
when people asked how happy they are and then asked how happy they would be in
another region). Ubel and his colleagues define a “focusing illusion” as “a failure to
appreciate that not all life domains or life events will be equally affected by a given change
in circumstances.” Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine, supra note 88, at 112.
90. Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 78 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 821, 822 (2000) [hereinafter Wilson et al.,
Focalism].
91. Gilbert and Wilson discuss four reasons why affective forecasting errors occur—
mental simulations of future events tend to be “unrepresentative” because they are based
on faulty memories, “essentialized” because they only include central features,
“abbreviated” because they are shorter than the actual event, and “decontextualized”
because they do not take place in the same circumstances as the actual event. Gilbert &
Wilson, Prospection, supra note 86, at 1352–54. Summarizing the research, they write:
“[The mind’s] simulations are deficient because they are based on a small number of
memories, they omit large numbers of features, they do not sustain themselves over time,
and they lack context. Compared to sensory perceptions, mental simulations are mere
cardboard cut-outs of reality.” Id. at 1354.
92. Wilson et al., Focalism, supra note 90, at 822.
93. Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine, supra note 88, at 113.
94. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7, at 619. Ubel and his coauthors
describe a similar phenomenon that they call “failure to consider adaptation.” Ubel et al.,
Disability and Sunshine, supra note 88, at 113. They describe this failure as a distinct type
of focusing illusion, noting:
People who have read a description of paraplegia should recognize that
paraplegia does not affect the person’s ability to enjoy a good TV show. However,
they may fail to consider that the grief they will feel upon finding out that they
have paraplegia will subside over time and that the sense of loss that they feel
because they have to abandon favorite pastimes will be replaced by the joy they
derive from other pastimes.
Id.
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are likely to feel bad following a negative event, subjects ignore the “set of
dynamic psychological processes . . . that produce a change in the relationship between what happens and how one feels.”95 The underestimation of hedonic adaptation “is probably the most commonly observed error in research on hedonic prediction.”96 When making predictions
about future changes, people tend to focus principally on the early stages
of those changes, when hedonic reactions are most intense. Adaptation,
as noted above, takes time, but the mental simulations people use to predict later emotional states are tightly condensed. Ex ante predictions
thus tend to overvalue the intensely emotional change and undervalue
the long period of recovery and adaptation.97
Perhaps the most significant research on focusing illusions and immune neglect is the increasing body of evidence indicating that healthy
people fail to predict the limited impact of disabilities on their quality of
life (QoL).98 One early study showed that, on a scale of zero (conditions
as bad as death) to one (perfect health), the general public estimates that
the quality of life for patients receiving home dialysis for life is 0.39, while
dialysis patients report their QoL as 0.56.99 Similarly, patients with colostomies rate their quality of life at 0.92, while patients without colostomies
predict that QoL with a colostomy would be 0.80.100 In addition,
Schkade and Kahneman have found that people who have known a paraplegic estimate that paraplegics spend considerably more time in a good
mood, while people who have not known a paraplegic estimate that
paraplegics spend more time in a bad mood.101 As the authors explain,
“The less you know about paraplegics, the worse off you think they
are.”102 Part of the problem, they suggest, is that when people are asked
to make these predictions, they evaluate the various outcomes as changes
rather than states. Schkade and Kahneman write, “[I]f people judge what
it is like to be a paraplegic by imagining what it is like to become a paraplegic, they will exaggerate the long-term impact of this tragic event on life
satisfaction.”103 As we will later argue, this focus on becoming rather than
being may account for certain aspects of victims’ settlement behavior. Re95. Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine, supra note 88, at 113.
96. Gilbert & Wilson, Prospection, supra note 86, at 1353.
97. Id.
98. As noted, the research compares the predictions of healthy people to the actual
ratings of disabled people. This research does not exactly match the situation that we are
concerned with in settlement negotiations, where the person making the prediction is
actually a recently injured victim. There is every reason to believe, however, that the same
biases affecting healthy people will also affect the recently injured. The latter are as likely
(if not more likely) to suffer from abbreviated, decontextualized, and essentialized
simulations of future states because they will be currently experiencing the intense
hedonic effects that tend to improperly color predictions.
99. Sackett & Torrance, supra note 88, at 702 tbl.4.
100. Boyd et al., supra note 64, at 63.
101. Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 89, at 340.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 345.
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cently injured plaintiffs will make the same kinds of errors when estimating the sum that they feel will adequately compensate them for their injuries that healthy people make because their attention will be directed
toward the major changes brought about by disability. Thus, they will
likely overestimate the long-term hedonic impact of their injuries.104
* * *
Much of the research on hedonic psychology is specifically targeted
toward policymakers in the health professions where new ideas about adaptation and focalism are likely to challenge received wisdom about informed consent and end of life decisions.105 That this research also has
profound consequences for the law is becoming increasingly clear.106
104. We use the term “overestimate” with some reservation. Considerable debate
exists about the policy implications of hedonic adaptation, particularly regarding the value
to be attached to ratings of subjective well-being. See, e.g., Paul Menzel et al., The Role of
Adaptation to Disability and Disease in Health State Valuation: A Preliminary Normative
Analysis, 55 Soc. Sci. & Med. 2149, 2157 (2002) (arguing for “an initial, prima facie
privilege for the perspective of the actual, typically adapted patient”). Perhaps the most
startling evidence for the limitations of subjective well-being as a measure of welfare comes
from a recent study by Dylan Smith and colleagues finding that former colostomy patients
(those who had had their colostomies reversed) were willing to trade forty-three months
out of the next ten years of their lives to have lived without a colostomy. Yet even this
finding seems to be the result of a focusing illusion, since current patients were only willing
to trade nineteen months while healthy patients would trade forty-four months. Dylan M.
Smith et al., Misremembering Colostomies? Former Patients Give Lower Utility Ratings
Than Do Current Patients, 25 Health Psychol. 688, 691 (2006).
105. See Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predicting a Changing Taste: Do People
Know What They Will Like?, 5 J. Behav. Decision Making 187, 198 (1992) (“[T]he value
that is attached to ‘informed consent’ to surgery is surely limited if patients are incapable
of assessing the quality of their post-surgical lives.”); see also Boyd et al., supra note 64, at
63–65 (demonstrating “substantial variation between different groups of individuals in the
utilities they attach to life with a colostomy” and finding “choice of treatment was strongly
influenced by the utility assigned to life with a colostomy”); Ubel et al., Do Nonpatients
Underestimate, supra note 88, at 190–91 (describing importance of assessing whether
people misestimate quality of life associated with health conditions to facilitate good
medical decisions by patients); Ubel et al., Misimagining the Unimaginable, supra note 88,
at S62 (noting that “people’s tendency to . . . ignore or underestimate the beneficial effects
of adaptation contributes to hedonic predictions that are more extreme than warranted”
and finding that this “put[s] people at risk for making poor decisions”).
106. See, e.g., Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The Problems of
Affective Forecasting, 80 Ind. L.J. 155 (2005). Blumenthal discusses the implications of
affective forecasting research for a range of legal issues including civil damage awards,
victim impact statements, the “death row phenomenon,” sexual harassment, surrogate
mothering, euthanasia, advance directives, informed consent, and litigants’ emotional
expectations. Id. at 182–223. In this last section, Blumenthal touches on the impact that
litigants’ mispredictions of future emotional states may have on litigation behavior, id. at
204–08, but he does not apply these findings to settlement behavior in the ways suggested
by our work, id.; see also Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 Cornell L. Rev.
1, 19 (2000) (examining behavioral economic implications of plaintiffs motivated by
noneconomic goals); Chris Guthrie & David Sally, The Impact of the Impact Bias on
Negotiation, 87 Marq. L. Rev. 817, 817 (2004) (suggesting that negotiation scholars and
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IMPROVED SETTLEMENT OPPORTUNITIES

Consider the class of injuries that involve ongoing disabilities or
losses of function, but not continuous pain—in other words, those to
which humans are capable of adapting hedonically.107 Where these types
of injuries give rise to lawsuits for personal injury, hedonic adaptation will
likely instigate a greater number of settlements than standard models
would predict. The long delays associated with the civil litigation process
practitioners pay attention to hedonic psychology); Peter H. Huang & Rick Swedloff,
Authentic Happiness and Meaning at Law Firms, 58 Syracuse L. Rev. 335, 339 (2008)
(discussing how creation of “authentic happiness and meaning for lawyers in law firm
settings may be a way to stem the tide of increased dissatisfaction and negative affect within
the legal profession”).
Oswald and Powdthavee, the economists responsible for the study discussed supra
notes 67–72 and accompanying text, framed their research in terms of its value to judges
and lawyers. Their goal is to use regression analysis to generate payment schedules that
would compensate victims for reductions in happiness. Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note
67, at 1071.
Cass Sunstein, in a recent paper, has suggested that affective forecasting errors by
jurors may be responsible for some of the variability in pain and suffering awards. Cass R.
Sunstein, Illusory Losses 2–3 (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
340 (2d Series), 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983810 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Sunstein, Illusory Losses]. According to Sunstein,
because jurors neglect hedonic adaptation, they will tend to overcompensate emotionally
salient yet highly adaptable injuries like paraplegia, but undercompensate less salient yet
unadaptable injuries such as headaches and migraines. Id. at 17–20.
In a recent article on hedonic damages and disability, Samuel Bagenstos and Margo
Schlanger also draw attention to the likelihood of jurors’ ignorance of the existence of
hedonic adaptation. Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages,
Hedonic Adaptation, and Disability, 60 Vand. L. Rev. 745, 760 (2008). When awarding
compensation for hedonic damages, jurors tend to focus inordinately on the limiting
effects of a disability and, as ostensibly healthy people, fail to recognize how well most
disabled people adapt. Drawing on disability rights literature, Bagenstos and Schlanger
suggest that by having healthy jurors pass judgment on the quality of life of disabled
people, the legal system devalues the experiences of people with disabilities and
encourages the perception of disability as a tragedy in need of pity and governmental
support. Id. at 784. Moreover, because the trial process requires that the plaintiff perform
her disability in front of the jury, the trial itself is debilitating. Id. at 785. The authors
suggest that “by focusing on the negative feelings that occur during [the initial adjustment
period], plaintiffs with disabilities may delay or derail their ultimate ability to adapt to their
new condition.” Id. Accordingly, they conclude that courts should not award hedonic
damages for decreased quality of life arising from disability. Id. at 788.
107. Injuries or conditions that fall into this category include loss of limb, partial
paralysis, loss of sexual function, blindness or deafness, and a variety of other disabilities
that will eventually heal to the point that the subject is no longer in pain, but not to the
point that the subject regains the lost functionality. For a more complete description, see
supra Part II. It is also possible that emotional injuries, such as the psychic pain caused
when someone is discriminated against on the basis of race or gender, are similarly
adaptable, and that plaintiffs will behave in a similar fashion after suffering such injuries.
(We thank Chris Guthrie for drawing this point to our attention.) Although the theory
behind hedonic adaptation would predict equal (or perhaps even greater) adaptation to
emotional trauma, as of this writing the empirical evidence of such adaptation is
substantially less robust.
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are commonly thought of as a source of costs to the system—costs that
should be avoided whenever possible. On their own, of course, drawn
out litigation procedures raise the costs of litigating to both sides (and to
the public at large), as all parties are forced to devote more time and
resources to the litigation. Lengthy litigation periods also delay the arrival of redress to the tort victim.108 In so doing, they may make potential
plaintiffs less likely to litigate in the first instance, or less likely to follow
through with already commenced litigation, as the means of support that
might allow the victim to pursue litigation disappear.109 For these reasons, the most prominent attempts at civil litigation reform have focused
on alternative methods of dispute resolution—in particular, arbitration110—that are designed to curb costs primarily by increasing the speed
at which cases are decided and eliminating many of the procedures that
typically serve to retard the rapid progression of litigation.111
We argue that even procedural delays have the capacity to reduce
certain costs to litigation. The explanation rests with the psychological
healing that the injury victim will undergo during the period before trial.
During the first few months that follow a severe injury—a period of time
that includes the filing of litigation and the initial pretrial procedures—
the plaintiff is likely to suffer from a focusing illusion. With her attention
focused on her injury, the plaintiff will overestimate its impact on her
future happiness: She will anticipate that the injury will prevent her from
achieving the same enjoyment of life that she experienced before being
hurt.112
However, during the nearly two years that it takes a typical civil case
to reach trial,113 the plaintiff is likely to adapt hedonically to her injury—
even if that injury is permanent—and will report levels of happiness
108. See supra Part I.
109. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (arguing that “termination of aid
pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the
very means by which to live while he waits” and thus put an end to the litigation itself).
110. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006).
111. See, e.g., J. Thomas Corbett, Mediation, Bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy
Administrator, 65 Ala. Law. 410, 410 (2004) (analyzing use of mediation in bankruptcy
proceedings and benefits in speed and cost of resolution); James P. George, Access to
Justice, Costs, and Legal Aid, in American Law in the 21st Century: National Reports to
the XVIIth International Congress of Comparative Law 293, 304 (John C. Reitz & David S.
Clark eds., 2006) (discussing states’ practice of inserting arbitration provisions into
remedial statutes); Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Cases and Dispute
Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11
Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2006) (recommending mediation as starting point in most
cases); cf. Samaha, supra note 9, at 620–47 (discussing potential constitutional problems
raised by provision or requirement of excessive legal process).
112. See Schkade & Kahneman, supra note 89, at 340 (observing this effect for
paraplegia); Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine, supra note 88, at 112 (observing this
effect with regard to variety of health conditions and comparing predictions of healthy
individuals against reported happiness of unhealthy individuals); Wilson et al., Focalism,
supra note 90, at 822 (describing focalism effects generally).
113. Supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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closer to her pre-injury levels.114 This adaptation will have two relevant
effects. First, the degree to which a plaintiff believes she has been
“wronged” will dissipate as her sense of the scale of the indignity that has
been perpetrated against her diminishes. Second, the amount of money
that the plaintiff believes will fairly compensate her for her injury—the
amount that will “make her whole” in the typical parlance of tort damages—will decrease. Immediately after a serious injury, a plaintiff is likely
to feel that only a sizeable amount of money will adequately compensate
her for the loss of function she has suffered; two years later, after the
plaintiff has had the opportunity to hedonically adapt and the injury
seems less debilitating, what the plaintiff perceives as appropriate compensation will decline as well.115
In combination, these two effects will drive down a tort plaintiff’s
settlement price over the course of litigation. Consider, for instance, a
plaintiff who loses a limb in a traffic accident (through no fault of her
own). Imagine that in the months that follow the injury, when the lawsuit
is initially filed, the plaintiff views her injury as highly incapacitating and
believes (a rough estimate, of course) that she will need $280,000 to compensate for her pain and suffering. Over the course of the two years between filing and trial, the plaintiff adapts to her injury and comes to believe that only $140,000 is necessary to fairly compensate her for the harm
she has suffered.116 Irrespective of the fact that the expected jury award
114. See generally supra Part II.
115. See supra Part I.C. We certainly do not mean to suggest that all types of tort
damages are susceptible to adaptation. Tort damages typically comprise a variety of linked
payments designed to compensate the plaintiff for various aspects of his injury. Plaintiffs
can recover damages for medical expenses and economic costs (typically lost wages due to
disability) incurred as a result of the injury. These expenses are not “adaptable” in the
sense we describe here; a plaintiff’s view of these costs is unlikely to change. But plaintiffs
may also recover damages for present and future pain and suffering, and in many
jurisdictions they are permitted to recoup so-called hedonic damages to compensate for
lost enjoyment of their lives. See Sunstein, Illusory Losses, supra note 106, at 3–4 &
nn.4–11. For specific examples of hedonic damage awards, see Allen v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 241 F.3d 1293, 1297–98 (10th Cir. 2001) (upholding jury instructions entitling
plaintiff to damages for loss of ability to ride horses); Day v. Ouachita Parish Sch. Bd., 823
So. 2d 1039, 1044 (La. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming damage award for loss of ability to play
high school sports). Plaintiffs will adjust to the losses for which these latter types of
damages are meant to compensate. Pain and suffering awards constitute approximately
fifty percent of the total value of monetary damages in personal injury cases, see W. Kip
Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 102–07 (1991) (finding that pain and suffering
damages account for “30 to 57 percent of all awards in which bodily injury payment has
been received,” and well over fifty percent of all awards in which there is a nonzero pain
and suffering award); Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and PostVerdict Adjustments of Those Awards, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 265, 296 (1998) (“[I]t seems
reasonable to conclude that the general damages portion of jury awards in malpractice
cases is, on average, between 50 and 60%.”), and so adaptation that reduces pain and
suffering damages could have a substantial effect on the overall valuation of a personal
injury case.
116. This is a reasonable approximation of a typical plaintiff’s ability to adapt. As we
noted previously, moderately disabled plaintiffs recover fifty percent of their “lost
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will not have changed, the plaintiff will likely see a lower settlement
amount as appropriate given the apparent amelioration of her injury.117
As the plaintiff’s settlement price declines commensurate with the significant degree of hedonic adaptation that humans typically experience,118
the chance of settlement increases—perhaps even substantially.119 Civil
settlements reduce costs,120 and many of the principal rules of civil litigation are designed with the goal of encouraging settlement.121 Hedonic
adaptation operates as a significant background complement to these
rules.
This is not to say, of course, that drawn out litigation procedures are
effective at driving parties toward settlement only insofar as they permit
the psychological immune system to operate. Discovery, for example, allows parties to eliminate the uncertainties that surround each side’s analysis of the case and thereby narrows the gap between their respective
valuations.
Nor do we mean to claim that hedonic adaptation—and the increased prospects for settlement that it carries—necessarily justifies each
and every procedural piece of the civil litigation puzzle from a cost-benefit perspective. The marginal adaptation generated by a particular procedural rule may be very slight, despite the fact that it imposes severe costs
upon the parties (and offers little else of value). Rather, we mean only to
argue that the current cost-benefit accounting of the civil trial process is
incorrect, and biased toward overestimation of litigation costs.122 By
drawing upon and facilitating hedonic adaptation, the civil trial process
happiness” through adaptation over a period of two years. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
117. See Korobkin & Guthrie, Psychological Barriers, supra note 27, at 130–33
(detailing results of experiment where acceptance of settlement offer differed based on
amount already recovered).
118. Supra notes 67–78 and accompanying text.
119. Supra Part I.C.
120. See, e.g., Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 93 (1902) (expressing view
that settlement is “a legitimate and desirable result in itself”); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for
Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 1553, 1574 (2006) (“[S]ettlements are in certain respects desirable, because they
conserve litigation expense and benefit parties who are in the best position to arrange
their own affairs.”). But cf. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073, 1076
(1984) (arguing that plaintiffs will effectively bear costs of litigation even if they settle
before trial as defendants reduce settlement offers to reflect litigation expenses which were
not incurred).
121. See, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 33 (“The court may direct the attorneys—and, when
appropriate, the parties—to participate in one or more conferences to address any matter
that may aid in disposing of the proceedings, including simplifying the issues and
discussing settlement.”); Fed. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., Alternative Dispute
Resolution Local Rules, California Rules of Court 489–505 (Thompson-West Federal ed.
2008) (setting forth extensive local rules intended to facilitate settlement); In re Young,
253 F.3d 926, 927 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.) (noting that settlements may typically be
kept confidential).
122. See supra notes 107–111 and accompanying text.
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manages to recoup for litigants some of the costs that the extensive prelitigation procedures would appear to impose upon them.123
IV. EXTENSIONS

AND

OBJECTIONS

The foregoing Parts set forth our case for adaptation’s power as an
inducement to settlement. In the sections that follow, we outline a number of ways in which we might test these theories empirically, and we
confront several of the most significant potential objections to our behavioral framework.
A. Testable Predictions
One of the strengths of our approach is that it generates testable
hypotheses regarding settlement rates for particular types of civil cases.
Consider two hypothetical personal injury lawsuits, one in which the
plaintiff has lost some mobility in an auto accident, and one in which the
plaintiff—as the result of a workplace injury—now suffers from recurring
migraine headaches.124 These two cases, if brought in the same jurisdic123. We note in passing that the concept of “closure” as an end goal for crime and
tort victims has gained tremendous currency in recent years. According to conventional
psychological wisdom, a victim gains something of value from achieving a sense of finality
regarding the crime or tort committed against him. See Susan Bandes, Victims, “Closure,”
and the Sociology of Emotion, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 3, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1112140 (“Closure has also come to stand for the constellation of feelings—
peace, relief, a sense of justice, the ability to move on—that come with finality.”); Elizabeth
Beck et al., Seeking Sanctuary: Interviews with Family Members of Capital Defendants, 88
Cornell L. Rev. 382, 387–90 (2003) (describing victims’ rights movement); cf. Douglas E.
Beloof, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88 Cornell L. Rev.
282, 288–89 (2003) (describing possible reasons for victims’ interest in sentencing of
defendants). This emphasis on closure does not fall neatly into classical economic models
or categories of preferences. Under standard economic assumptions, the most that might
be said is that individuals derive utility by achieving finality—by being able to put one
matter aside as successfully completed in order to focus on others. Here, “closure” is an
end in itself, and one of dubious pedigree at that.
The evidence for hedonic adaptation provides an alternative, deeper explanation. For
a tort plaintiff, “closure” means the definitive end to legal proceedings and the end of one
setting in which the plaintiff might be reminded of her condition. On this account,
realizing closure from a lawsuit is a means of facilitating the process of hedonic adaptation.
The more quickly and completely a plaintiff can put matters concerning an accident
behind her and “move on,” the sooner her psychological immune system can bury
thoughts of her injury and adapt the plaintiff hedonically to her new circumstances.
Litigants may understand these processes at a conscious level—the search for closure may
be deliberate and knowing—or only at an unconscious one—and thus seek closure for
reasons not entirely known or understood. On either account, people will act to their own
hedonic advantage by seeking closure on matters that have the potential to reinvigorate
painful memories. Plaintiffs are thus likely to view settlement as the most ready means by
which to gain closure and smooth the progress of psychological repair.
124. This dichotomy is discussed in Sunstein, Illusory Losses, supra note 106, at 19.
For examples of cases involving enduring, nonadaptable injuries, see Sarchet v. Chater, 78
F.3d 305 (7th Cir. 1996) (fibromyalgia); Westphal v. Wal-Mart Stores, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46
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tion, will involve symmetric pretrial procedures: discovery, mediation,
motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and so forth. A priori,
there is every reason to expect that any divergences between the plaintiff
and defendant in each case—informational asymmetries, discrepancies in
litigation valuation, etc.—will themselves be symmetric across cases. Imagine further that the two cases have approximately equivalent expected
values when litigated before a jury. Based on these considerations alone,
the auto accident plaintiff and the workplace accident plaintiff should be
equally likely to settle before trial.
The lone difference between these cases, as conceived here, is that
the auto injury plaintiff will likely be able to adapt to his loss of function
while the workplace injury plaintiff will not. The loss of mobility is a paradigm case for the power of hedonic adaptation; studies have shown that
even people who lose the power to walk nearly return to pre-injury levels
of happiness.125 By contrast, recurrent conditions such as headaches and
ringing in the ears present among the worst cases for adaptation.126 By
the time that several years of pretrial machinations have run their course,
the workplace injury plaintiff is likely to perceive herself as still suffering
in a way that the auto accident plaintiff genuinely does not. The auto
injury plaintiff will be willing to settle for a range of values that the workplace injury plaintiff would still consider inadequate. Our theory thus
generates three predictions:
1. During the time between filing and trial, settlement demands
from plaintiffs with adaptable injuries will decrease in value by greater
margins than settlement demands from plaintiffs with nonadaptable
injuries.
2. Consequently, personal injury cases involving adaptable injuries will settle at higher rates than personal injury cases involving
nonadaptable injuries, ceteris paribus.
3. Independent of the effects of costs and informational advantages, hedonic adaptation will cause settlement rates for adaptable personal injury to increase as the time between filing and trial increases.
This last hypothesis warrants further explanation. Lengthy pretrial
procedures have the capacity to induce settlement in two ways that are
orthogonal to our analysis here. First, they may increase the costs of proceeding along the path to trial, thus rendering pretrial settlement more
(Ct. App. 1998) (chronic pain); Hatcher v. Ramada Plaza Hotel & Conf. Ctr., No.
CV010807378S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS 255 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2003) (persistent joint
pain); Bayer Corp. v. Lassiter, 638 S.E.2d 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (tinnitus); City of Cedar
Rapids v. Mun. Fire & Police Ret. Sys., 526 N.W.2d 284 (Iowa 1995) (chronic pain
syndrome); Levy v. Bayou Indus. Maint. Servs., 855 So. 2d 968 (La. Ct. App. 2003)
(postconcussion syndrome, including headaches, dizziness, and vertigo); Strawderman v.
Creative Label Co., 508 S.E.2d 365 (W. Va. 1998) (migraine headaches).
125. See, e.g., Lundqvist et al., supra note 62, at 80–81 (demonstrating that subjects
who have incurred spinal injuries are nearly as happy as the general population four years
after their injuries).
126. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
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attractive. Second, they frequently (though not always) serve to provide
the parties with greater information regarding the respective strengths of
their cases, information that narrows the gap between the parties’ subjective valuations and facilitates accord.127 Consider, then, a set of accelerated pretrial procedures that provide the same informational gains to the
parties as standard litigation practices and generate the same level of
costs. (An accelerated litigation calendar—for instance, the Eastern
District of Virginia’s famous “rocket docket”128—would possess this feature.) We predict that cases litigated on such an accelerated schedule will
settle at a lower rate than cases litigated at a more deliberate speed.
Empirical tests of these hypotheses are beyond the scope of this
Essay. Nonetheless, the necessary data, particularly concerning hypotheses two and three, should be relatively easy to obtain. Empirical analysis
of hedonic adaptation has matured into a vigorous science;129 we hope
that empirical research into adaptation’s effects on the trial process will
soon follow suit.
B. Principal Objections
The reader by now undoubtedly has in mind a number of objections
to the model we describe and the conclusions we set forth in the preceding Parts. In the sections that follow, we address some of the most prominent of these objections.
1. Litigation Behavior and Agency Relationships. — The model of civil
litigation we employ is, of course, overly simplified in perhaps two important respects. First, and most importantly, it does not take into account
the potential for attorney-client agency costs to interfere with the smooth
translation of client preferences into litigation decisions.130 Much has
been made in recent years of the growth of an attorney-centered litigation model, in which the attorney—the sophisticated repeat player—
drives the litigation and makes the preponderance of important decisions.131 Certainly, if the plaintiff exerts no control over a lawsuit, her
adaptation is irrelevant.132 But that is a caricature of the attorney-client
127. See Posner, supra note 28, at 422–26 (discussing this function performed by
pretrial procedure).
128. See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract
Design, 115 Yale L.J. 814, 829 & n.34 (2006) (describing Eastern District of Virginia’s
reputation for rapid resolution of litigation).
129. See generally supra Part II. The foremost example is probably Oswald and
Powdthavee’s longitudinal study of thousands of British citizens. Oswald & Powdthavee,
supra note 67.
130. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
131. This trend, which is generally viewed unfavorably, is closely related to the less
pejorative theory of “directive lawyering,” in which lawyers make “moral” decisions
irrespective of the bad intentions of their clients. Robert F. Cochran, Jr. et al., Symposium:
Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 591, 594–96 (2003).
132. Similarly, if the plaintiff has already recovered from her insurer, and the
insurance company is the true plaintiff at suit, see June F. Entman, More Reasons for
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relationship; more likely, each party will have some say over the most important litigation choices, particularly the question of when and whether
to settle.133
If this is the case, attorney-client agency costs should not diminish
the effects of adaptation that we describe. Ninety-five percent of personal
injury plaintiffs are represented by attorneys working on a contingent fee
basis.134 Contingent fee attorneys will tend to prefer early settlement
over protracted litigation because they bear all of the costs and risks of
protracted court battles.135 Thus it is the rare contingent fee attorney
who will stand in the way of an adapted plaintiff’s desire to settle; far
more frequently, cases that do not settle when the attorney wishes fail to
do so because an unsatisfied client preferred to continue to trial. Adaptation will mitigate this effect.
Second, delays and time lags in litigation are often caused by hard
bargaining and acrimony between the parties. As much as the adaptation
that follows from delay might increase the rate of settlement, the rancor
that accompanies it might act in the opposite direction. We wish to stress
that we make no claims on the ultimate frequency of settlement in protracted or expeditious cases (or the relative rates of settlement in each
case). We mean only to say that all things being equal, delay will drive settlement through hedonic adaptation. As we note above, lengthy cases
may generate greater information or drive up costs,136 making settlement
more likely; these effects are ancillary to our general theory, much like
the acrimonious nature of long cases. When litigation is delayed by exogenous factors beyond the parties’ control—a court’s docket schedule, for
instance—the effects of adaptation should be most evident.
Abolishing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(a): The Problem of the Proper Plaintiff and
Insurance Subrogation, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 893, 908–11 (1990) (describing subrogation of
claims by insurance companies), the plaintiff’s adaptation will not affect the lawsuit. Of
course, even insured tort victims are typically uninsured as to pain and suffering and are
never insured for anything resembling a punitive damages claims. See Randall R. Bovbjerg
et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 Nw. U. L. Rev.
908, 932 n.125 (1989) (“No health coverage, public or private, explicitly pays for noneconomic damages . . . .”); Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical
Malpractice Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 391, 401 (2005) (“[E]vidence confirms that
patients do not purchase coverage for noneconomic damages as part of first-party health
care insurance.”).
133. See Model Code of Prof’l Responsibility EC 7-7 (2001) (“[I]t is for the client to
decide whether he will accept a settlement offer . . . .”).
134. Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or
a Market for Champerty?, 71 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 625, 626 n.3 (1995).
135. See John Bronsteen, Class Action Settlements: An Opt-In Proposal, 2005 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 903, 911–12 (“The lawyer could settle many cases in the time it takes to litigate one,
so it is rational for her to settle quickly even if doing so reduces her profit in the individual
case.”); Charles Silver, Class Actions—Representative Proceedings, in 5 Encyclopedia of
Law and Economics 194, 213 (B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest eds., 2000) (suggesting that
economic factors make plaintiffs’ attorneys predisposed to settle).
136. See supra Part IV.A.
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The same analysis would apply if defendants began to understand
the processes of hedonic adaptation and refused to begin settlement negotiations until later in the case, after the plaintiff had an opportunity to
adapt. It is entirely possible that the result of defendants’ strategic behavior would be to curb the rate of settlement, or at least the rate of early
settlement. We make no claims to the contrary. Even under such circumstances, plaintiffs’ settlement price would diminish, ceteris paribus, as
time passed, and settlement would become more likely as litigation dragged on.137
2. Focalism in Settlement Negotiations. — While the evidence supporting theories of hedonic adaptation has by this point become quite robust,138 psychologists and economists remain divided and uncertain as to
the methods and mechanisms by which it operates. Candidate theories
focus on changes in the victim’s aspirations,139 standards,140 and interpretations of the negative event’s meaning.141 Nonetheless, the leading
hypothesis is the notion that humans are simply capable of blocking out
or ignoring losses and limitations, even when they affect matters of daily
life.142 For instance, an individual who becomes paralyzed below the
waist and must use a wheelchair may occasionally be reminded of the fact
that she is in a wheelchair and is therefore incapable of many typical
activities. But for the most part her injury is background noise; she
neither thinks about it nor perceives the ways in which it limits her. As
Daniel Kahneman, the pioneer of this theory, has explained in particularly pithy form: “Nothing in life matters quite as much as you think it
does while you are thinking about it.”143 This “focalism”144 raises the possibility that settlement negotiations, which we posit here as a beneficial
side effect of hedonic adaptation, may be self-defeating. The very fact of
negotiating a settlement of the plaintiff’s lawsuit might remind the plain137. This type of strategic behavior might eventually result in a type of cycling
equilibrium, in which defendants first refused to settle early, followed by plaintiffs’ credible
threats to refuse settlement late in the litigation, followed by defendants loosening their
strategic stance and returning to early settlements, and so forth.
138. See generally supra Part II.
139. See Easterlin, supra note 56, at 11,180, 11,182 (suggesting that people’s
aspirations change commensurately with changes in life circumstances).
140. See Menzel et al., supra note 104, at 2151–52 (noting “people who have what is
commonly thought of as a ‘disability’ or ‘disease’ may be stimulated to adopt a radically
different and, in their eyes, a more insightful definition of their health”).
141. See Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 85, at 133 (“People are
motivated to recover from negative emotional events, and the kind of sense making they
engage in often involves coping, psychological defenses, and rationalization.”).
142. See Kahneman & Sugden, Experienced Utility, supra note 53, at 168 (“[I]f some
factor continues to operate over time, the corresponding experience of happiness or
unhappiness becomes less intense.”); Sunstein, Illusory Losses, supra note 106, at 14–15
(explaining transition in focus over time to “central features of [injured people’s] hours
and days” after significant loss); supra Part II.B.
143. Kahneman & Thaler, Utility Maximization, supra note 82, at 229 (citing Schkade
& Kahneman, supra note 89).
144. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
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tiff of the severity (or existence) of her condition, subvert the process of
hedonic adjustment, and return the plaintiff, at least momentarily, to her
diminished post-injury state of happiness. Settlement-induced “hedonic
relapse” could re-inflate the plaintiff’s perception of the severity of her
injury and its worth.
Although this counterproductive effect may occur in many settings,
we do not believe it poses a serious threat to the settlement-forcing adaptation that we’ve detailed here. Typical settlement negotiations do not
involve the type of discussions that are most likely to trigger hedonic relapse. Late period settlement negotiations are most likely to revolve
around dollar figures, and nothing more.
At the inception of litigation, before the parties have conducted discovery and fully defined the scope of claims, any negotiations between
the plaintiff and defendant—indeed, any conversations between the
plaintiff and her attorney—are likely to revolve around the scope of the
plaintiff’s injury. The plaintiff’s (or defendant’s) attorney may intend for
the plaintiff to visit an additional set of doctors; the parties may be uncertain as to the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; and the plaintiff herself may
not know or understand the long-term lifestyle effects of her condition.
Throughout this early stage, the plaintiff’s attorney will attempt to emphasize or even exaggerate the severity of the plaintiff’s injury in an attempt to increase the value of the litigation.145 These types of interactions cannot help but retard the process of hedonic adaptation.
As scholars have noted, the trial itself is also likely to create negative
focalism effects.146 The plaintiff will be seated in court every day as the
parties rehash the plaintiff’s injury and debate the continuing effects of
that injury upon the plaintiff’s life. The plaintiff will hear expert testimony from both sides regarding her health and disability. And she will
likely be called upon to testify about her accident and continuing health.
Even if the plaintiff has succeeded in adapting hedonically by the time
that her case reaches trial, the trial itself is likely to undo those gains.
Yet between the initial stages of the litigation and the trial, the plaintiff’s health holds very little day-to-day importance. Once the plaintiff’s
condition has become a known quantity, there is no further need for the
sides to discuss it. We argue that it is during this period that the plaintiff’s adaptive response begins to operate, as the injury and the medically
intensive inception of litigation both begin to fade into the background.
If the case does not settle shortly after it is filed, this fallow period
may be punctuated by settlement offers and negotiations by both sides.
These interactions, however, bear little resemblance in form or substance
to the type of emotional presentations that characterize a personal injury
145. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 106, at 753 (“A leading practitioners’
treatise . . . advises lawyers seeking hedonic damages for disabling injuries to turn the trial
into a maudlin spectacle . . . .”).
146. See, e.g., id. at 785 (pointing out that plaintiffs with disabilities will delay their
adaptation if forced to testify about their disabilities at trial).
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trial.147 By this point, settlement offers are likely to take the form of suggested dollar figures, and little else. By the time that the parties reach the
negotiating table, the attorneys will have latched onto approximate case
valuations and acceptable settlement ranges, and reaching agreement on
a particular number will be the sole priority.
Importantly, plaintiffs are most often bystanders to these negotiations.148 Any conversation between the plaintiff and his attorney will almost certainly concern only whether the plaintiff wishes to accept a proffered settlement offer or hold out for more money.149 These
communications do not involve rehashing the facts of the case or reexamining the plaintiff’s injuries; to the extent that this sort of hard bargaining
takes place, it will occur almost entirely between the attorneys.150 Later
period settlement negotiations thus will not function as indelible reminders of the plaintiff’s condition in the same fashion that a full trial on the
merits—complete with extensive testimony by the plaintiff—might. As
such, they are likely to produce only minimal focalism.151
Much has been made of the attorney-client relationship as a classic
principal-agent problem.152 According to the standard model of attor147. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
148. See Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers and Their Clients:
Power and Meaning in the Legal Process 59 (1995) (describing lawyers’ insistence on
negotiating attorney-to-attorney); John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics
and Practice of Lawyer Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering,
64 Ohio St. L.J. 1315, 1362 (2003) (“In many traditional cases, represented clients do not
personally participate in negotiation.”).
149. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
150. Cf. Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of
Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 Md. L. Rev. 1, 84–85 (1992) (describing settlement
negotiations between opposing attorneys as “stylized” and “slightly exaggerated, somewhat
predictable, and essentially impersonal”).
151. It is worth noting that there is good reason to believe that active engagement in
the settlement process may in fact promote hedonic adaptation in injured plaintiffs.
Among the best predictors of individual adaptation is a person’s perceived level of selfcontrol. See Glenn Affleck et al., Appraisals of Control and Predictability in Adapting to a
Chronic Disease, 53 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 273, 278 (1987) (finding “patients who
reported greater personal control over their medical care and treatment expressed more
positive mood”). Thus, getting to make decisions about the course of litigation may
enhance a person’s sense of control and at least moderate any negative effects brought
about by refocusing on the injury. On the psychological benefits of client-controlled
litigation, see Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Role of Counsel in
Litigation, 37 Cal. W. L. Rev. 105, 112–13 (2000) (“Negotiation can itself be a healing
process, bringing together disputants to discuss and iron out their differences, and helping
them to resolve their conflicts and to achieve reconciliation . . . . Exercising a degree of
control and self-determination in significant aspects of one’s life may be an important
ingredient of psychological wellbeing.”).
152. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669, 726 (1986) (“[T]he basic goal of reform should
be to reduce the agency costs incident to this attorney-client relationship. While various
means to this end are possible . . . all should be understood as responses to this agency cost
problem and debated in that light.”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
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ney-client relations, the attorney manages the litigation and structures
the investigation, analysis, and discussion of the relevant issues in order to
impel the client toward her (the attorney’s) preferred outcomes. This
litigation structure is commonly thought of as imposing costs upon plaintiffs—and upon third parties who may depend on litigation to provide
remuneration and deterrence—through the potential misalignment of
incentives.153 Yet in personal injury cases, the attorney’s function as an
emotional screen may help facilitate hedonic adaptation and confer genuine benefits on litigants from both sides.
3. Civil Damages As an Adaptive Mechanism? — Modern research on
happiness and hedonic adaptation quite obviously poses a number of
challenges to classical economic models. Standard rational choice economics would predict that a loss of function or capability would have substantial long-term effects on a person’s happiness. Deprivation of the option value of a set of previously held capabilities—and thus of a variety of
forms of activity and entertainment—would cause the disabled person to
be less happy in the long run, assuming that perfect substitutes for those
activities are unavailable.154 Moreover, standard economic models would
predict that a person’s happiness level should not change without a material change in that person’s circumstances or an exogenously forced
change in preferences. The very existence of hedonic adaptation belies
these predictions.
In response to the burgeoning literature on happiness, economists
have proposed a number of explanations that would account for evidence
of adaptation within the confines of classical rational choice understanding of human behavior. The most plausible explanation posits that studies purporting to find hedonic adaptation in fact succeed only in capturing precisely the changes in circumstance that economists predict would
Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 3–5 (1991) (describing continuing
problems posed by attorney-client agency costs deriving from attorneys’ control over
litigation and suggesting reforms to mitigate these costs).
153. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan et al., Suing for Medical Malpractice 77–78 (1993)
(noting even greater attorney-client agency costs when injured plaintiff seeks to fulfill
noneconomic goals, including disclosure of information, revenge, and specific deterrence,
which are unavailing to her attorney); Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do
Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court
Litigation Outcomes, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1235, 1244 (2006) (“The presence of a lawyer
as agent of a client-principal introduces costs that unrepresented litigants do not face,
because, if lawyers are rational actors, they may tend to maximize interests that differ from
those of their clients.”); Michael A. Perino, Class Action Chaos? The Theory of the Core
and an Analysis of Opt-Out Rights in Mass Tort Class Actions, 46 Emory L.J. 85, 140–41
(1997) (“Significant agency costs may be imposed on the clients because the attorney . . .
may seek to promote her best interests ahead of one or both groups of clients. Indeed . . .
if the attorney makes the decisions for both parties, then those parties should in reality be
considered a single player.”).
154. See Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 841,
855–69 (2006) (discussing loss of option value in context of environmental litigation and
injunctive relief).
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raise happiness levels in the wake of serious injury or disability.155 In
other words, tort victims are increasingly happy over time not because
their psychological immune systems have successfully adapted them to
their injuries, but because insurance payments, tort settlements, or even
increased attention from family and friends have kicked in and restored
them to their prior hedonic level. Economists view this hedonic restoration as an indication that insurance and tort settlements are achieving the
proper effect, genuinely functioning as “make whole” remedies for accident victims.
Were this the case, it would pose a significant challenge to the theory
we advance here. If what appears to be “hedonic adaptation” is only a
product of the successful resolution of lawsuits and insurance claims,
then our causal arrow points in precisely the wrong direction.
Yet the data do not appear to support this view. If cash payments via
insurance or tort lawsuits were driving hedonic improvements, personal
income should serve as the best indicator for when hedonic adaptation
would occur, and when income is held constant, researchers should find
no evidence of adaptation. However, studies of people with moderate
and severe disabilities produce evidence of hedonic adaptation even after
controlling for household income.156 Likewise, if injury victims were
adapting because of increased involvement by their family and friends, we
would expect that differences in family structure or marital status would
largely explain observed hedonic adaptation. Again, this has not proven
to be the case. Although family size and marital status—along with income—have statistically meaningful effects on the rate and extent of postinjury adaptation,157 these effects do not account for the entirety of adaptation. Most adaptation appears to occur for reasons having nothing to
do with family size or structure.158 The conclusion we draw from these
studies is that although wealth and a supportive family may aid the process of hedonic adaptation, the normal functioning of the psychological
immune system alone would be enough to drive adaptation, and thus
spur settlement.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of a devastating or crippling injury, it is only natural for
most people to believe that their future lives will be significantly impacted, and their future happiness severely diminished. In keeping with
these dire predictions, it is not surprising that victims who bring suit
against their injurers will initially demand large compensating awards,
155. We thank Thomas Miles for drawing our attention to this possibility.
156. See Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 67, at 1068 tbl.1.
157. See id.
158. See id. Oswald and Powdthavee’s regressions demonstrate that the effects of
time—which they interpret as the workings of the psychological immune system—are at
minimum between five and ten times larger than the effects generated by marriage, family
size, income, or any other potential confounding factor. Id.
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certain that those payments will be necessary if they are to have any hope
of returning to their pre-injury quality of life. In reality, however, we now
know that humans can adapt readily to even debilitating injuries. A scant
two years after losing a limb or the ability to walk, an accident victim often
will have recaptured much of the happiness she experienced prior to the
injury. This human capacity for hedonic adaptation is likely to have
profound consequences on the tort suits that personal injury victims
bring against their tortfeasors. The typical personal injury lawsuit drags
on for almost two years from the date it is filed until the day that it
reaches trial. In the course of these two years, adaptation will drive down
the settlement prices for many personal injury plaintiffs, enlarging the
available window for negotiation between plaintiffs and defendants and
increasing the rate of settlement. The passage of some appreciable span
of time is essential to the process; were civil litigation not prone to such
stagnation, the psychological immune system would have no time within
which to operate. Procedural delays—long considered a pure source of
costs to litigants—thus function simultaneously to increase the
probability that plaintiffs and defendants in personal injury cases will be
able to avoid the cost of trial.
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